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Background: The increasing frequency and intensity of dengue outbreaks in endemic and non-endemic countries
requires a rational, evidence based response. To this end, we aimed to collate the experiences of a number of
affected countries, identify strengths and limitations in dengue surveillance, outbreak preparedness, detection and
response and contribute towards the development of a model contingency plan adaptable to country needs.
Methods: The study was undertaken in five Latin American (Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru)
and five in Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Vietnam). A mixed-methods approach was used
which included document analysis, key informant interviews, focus-group discussions, secondary data analysis and
consensus building by an international dengue expert meeting organised by the World Health Organization, Special
Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (WHO-TDR).
Results: Country information on dengue is based on compulsory notification and reporting (“passive surveillance”),
with laboratory confirmation (in all participating Latin American countries and some Asian countries) or by using a
clinical syndromic definition. Seven countries additionally had sentinel sites with active dengue reporting, some also
had virological surveillance. Six had agreed a formal definition of a dengue outbreak separate to seasonal variation in
case numbers. Countries collected data on a range of warning signs that may identify outbreaks early, but none had
developed a systematic approach to identifying and responding to the early stages of an outbreak. Outbreak response
plans varied in quality, particularly regarding the early response. The surge capacity of hospitals with recent dengue
outbreaks varied; those that could mobilise additional staff, beds, laboratory support and resources coped best in
comparison to those improvising a coping strategy during the outbreak. Hospital outbreak management plans were
present in 9/22 participating hospitals in Latin-America and 8/20 participating hospitals in Asia.
Conclusions: Considerable variation between countries was observed with regard to surveillance, outbreak detection,
and response. Through discussion at the expert meeting, suggestions were made for the development of a more
standardised approach in the form of a model contingency plan, with agreed outbreak definitions and country-specific
risk assessment schemes to initiate early response activities according to the outbreak phase. This would also allow
greater cross-country sharing of ideas.
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Dengue is the most rapidly expanding arboviral disease
and dengue outbreaks exert a huge burden on populations,
health systems and economies in most tropical countries
[1]. Dengue-endemic countries and also a number of coun-
tries with low-level or no transmission are threatened by
outbreaks that are detected at a late stage and where the
response mechanisms are often inadequate. Here, the term
“outbreak” (used synonymously with “epidemic”) is defined
as a “sudden unexpected increase of cases” or as ‘the oc-
currence in a community or region of cases of an illness
clearly in excess of expectancy’ [2]. Such a “sudden and un-
expected increase” (outbreak) is different from the seasonal
peak, which is an “expected increase in cases” that usually
occurs at the end or after the wet season.
Early detection of outbreaks poses a challenge, since no
universally accepted operational definition of an outbreak
exists and methods for distinguishing between seasonal
fluctuations and true outbreaks are not generally applied.
Candidate indicators for predicting a dengue outbreak, or
for early outbreak detection through “syndromic surveil-
lance” in order to trigger an early response, have been pro-
posed [3]. However, our earlier literature review found
that there were no systematic analyses or validations of
these putative indicators or of their operational reliability
and cost-effectiveness [4]. The published evidence-base is
equally poor when it comes to defining what constitutes
an effective and efficient outbreak response: remarkably,
there are no proven methods recommendable for epi-
demic vector control [5,6] or for clinical-health systems
management when there is a surge in cases. In a system-
atic literature review about the few documented experi-
ences with outbreak response some criteria were
highlighted [7] in relation to a) management of outbreak
response (multidisciplinary response teams, Incorporation
of public organisations, written information for mass
media, monitoring and evaluation of all control activities),
b) management of vector control (‘search and destroy’
teams, communities involvement, geographical coverage
of activities, enhanced surveillance, education of house-
holds) and c) management of health services (staff
training-including laboratory staff ), mosquito nets in hos-
pitals, establishing case report conferences, adequate sup-
plies for laboratory and case management).
Following the efforts by Gubler et al. [8] to sketch the
surveillance efforts in a number of dengue endemic coun-
tries, there was a first attempt to define best practices in
dengue surveillance in Latin America and Asia through
expert meetings [9]. This resulted in a number of useful
general recommendations: dengue should be notifiable, re-
gional disease classification applied, electronic reporting
developed, laboratory networks initiated, reporting fo-
cussed at the essentials, additional studies done and early
prediction of outbreaks achieved.To the best of our knowledge however, comparative
studies on dengue surveillance and outbreak response
using the same methodologies across participant countries
have not yet been published. To get a more comprehen-
sive view of existing surveillance systems and early out-
break detection ability, we analysed the contingency plans
from 11 countries, updated the systematic literature re-
view on dengue surveillance (publications in preparation)
and report here on the analysis of dengue surveillance,
outbreak detection and response in10 countries in Asia
and Latin America. The purpose is to contribute to the
development of a new evidence-based model for dengue
surveillance and outbreak response, adaptable to individ-
ual country requirements and capacities, combining the
best of existing strategies with a framework for the acqui-
sition of evidence for novel approaches and tools. On the
basis of the findings presented in this paper a model con-
tingency plan will be developed, adapted to country needs
and prospectively tested in different settings.
Methods
This study used a mixed methods approach combining
key informant interviews, document analysis, focus group
discussions, secondary data analyses and interpretation by
an international dengue expert meeting. In order to get
representative information on dengue endemic countries,
five countries in Latin America (Brazil, Colombia, Domin-
ican Republic, Mexico, Peru) and five countries in Asia
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Vietnam) were
selected, based on the following criteria: a) representation
of large (e.g. Brazil, Indonesia), intermediate (e.g. Peru,
Vietnam) and small countries (e.g. Dominican Republic,
Maldives) in each region; b) recent dengue outbreaks; c)
existing relations with Ministries of Health and academic
institutions to ensure openness and confidence between
respondents and interviewers. Three countries were ex-
cluded as they had been analysed previously in a WHO-
TDR supported study: Thailand, Cambodia and Bolivia
(Runge-Ranzinger et al. unpublished data). Within the
study countries, academic institutions and/or Ministries of
Health were approached to select country interviewers
who had public health knowledge, understanding of both
disease surveillance and dengue, and skills in undertaking
interviews. The interviewers received detailed instructions
and data collection forms that roughly followed the Cen-
ters for Disease and Prevention “framework for evaluating
public health surveillance systems for early detection of
outbreaks” [3] and had been pre-tested and revised follow-
ing use in 3 countries (Nepal, Bangladesh, and Colombia).
The set of data collection forms comprised:
a) Questionnaire for interviewers about the country
context (data to be extracted from published and
unpublished documents in the country).
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surveillance and response” that included 83 items to
be covered in relation to dengue disease surveillance,
case notification and dengue classification,
virological surveillance, routine vector surveillance
and control, community participation during non-
epidemic periods, outbreak preparedness, outbreak
detection, recent experiences with a dengue
outbreak and opinions about the success of the
outbreak response.
c) Hospital questionnaire with 38 items about outbreak
preparedness in hospitals, available resources in
non-epidemic periods, characteristics of the last
dengue outbreak, availability of resources during the
outbreak, opinions about successes and failures of
outbreak management.
d) Topic guide for focus group discussions to be
applied in hospitals with a recent dengue outbreak
e) Matrix for the summarisation of collected
information.
The work within countries included the following:
1. General appraisal of the epidemiology of dengue in the
study country (questionnaire for interviewers mainly to
be filled at national and State/Provincial level).
2. Semi-structured interviews using a list of 83 topics
to be discussed with the interviewees (questionnaire/
topic guide “evaluating dengue surveillance and
response”). These data collection forms, developed
with the above-mentioned framework for evaluating
surveillance systems in mind (Buehler et al. 2004),
were applied to key informants in each country at
different levels: a) Government officials (central
level): decision or policy maker, epidemiologist/
surveillance expert, laboratory expert (microbiologist
or technician), entomologist, other. b) Government
officials (state/province/district, sub-district level):
epidemiologist/surveillance expert, laboratory expert
(microbiologist and/or laboratory technician),
entomologist, other. The number of interviews to be
conducted followed the “saturation principle” (when
no further information could be collected from
informants the interview series was terminated) and
included in general 20 to 30 respondents per
country.
3. The hospital questionnaire with 38 items was
applied in each country in 3 to 5 hospitals of
different levels (teaching hospital, district hospital,
sub-district hospital) using a purposive sampling
strategy. At most sites there were none or only a few
more similar hospitals in the study area.
4. Focus group discussions [10] with hospital staff
involved in the last dengue outbreak were conductedfor complementing the information obtained from
individual interviews.
Combining complementary methodologies and infor-
mation from varied sources, as well as several rounds of
data verification before, during and after the expert
meeting ensured a high level of internal validity provid-
ing more reliable results.
Ethical approval was received from WHO Regional Of-
fices (Ethical Review Boards at the Pan American Health
Organisation (PAHO), South-East Asian Regional Office
(SEARO) and the Western Pacific Regional Office (WPRO)
which was accepted by the study countries except for Peru
where an additional ethical approval was obtained from the
Institutional Review Board at Cayetano Heredia University.
Verbal, and in some cases, written consent was obtained
from respondents. The interviewees were assured of the
anonymisation of their responses and interviews took place
in closed rooms with no other persons being present. The
completed forms were kept in separate files and no individ-
ual names of the respondents were recorded.
The country interviewers completed the data collection
in the following areas:
Brazil: Brasilia Ministry of Health (National level).
Pernambuco, Amazonas, Rio de Janeiro and Goiás
(State level). Interviews at health units and hospitals in
Amazonas and Rio de Janeiro (local level).
Colombia: Bogota (National Institute of Health National
level), Departamento Valle del Cauca (State level).
Dominican Republic: Santo Domingo (National level)
Santiago Valverde, San Juan, Azua, and Hato Mayor
(Provincial level), Laguna Salada, Esperanza y Cienfuegos
(Municipality level).
Mexico: Mexico City Ministry of Health (National level),
Yukatan and Guerrero (State level).
Peru: Lima Ministry of Health (National level), Loreto
and San Martin (State or Regional level), interviews in
hospitals of Iquitos (Loreto), Tarapoto and Moyobamba
(San Martin local level).
Indonesia: Jakarta (National Provincial and District level)
Yogyakarta (Provincial level) Bantul (District level).
Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur Ministry of Health, Federal
Territory of Putrajaya (National level), Selangor, Penang
(State level) Klang Hulu Langat, Gombak , Petaling,
Banting, Kuala Selangor(District level).
Maldives: Male Ministry of Health (National. level),
Hulumale, Thinadoo, Addu (Regional and District level).
Sri Lanka: Colombo Ministry of Health, Medical Research
Institute (National level), Colombo and Gampaha district
(District level), hospital interviews in three hospitals in
Colombo and Gampaha District (local level).
Vietnam: Ha Noi Ministry of Health and National
Hospital of Infectious Diseases (National level) Ho Chi
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hospital, Pasteur Institute, University of Medicine and
Pharmacy, Preventive Medicine Centre of Ho Chi Minh
City) Dong Thap province (Provincial Hospital Dong
Thap Preventive Medicine Centre and Volunteer
Group for Dengue).
The field work was done within a 5 month period
(October 2011 to March 2012). The interviewers pro-
duced a comprehensive report which included a de-
tailed analysis of the dengue epidemiology in their
country, the completed data collection forms and the
completed matrix with the summary of findings of each
item in the questionnaire/topic guide “Evaluating den-
gue surveillance and response”. The information pack-
age was sent to the central team at WHO-TDR for
compilation and preliminary comparative analysis. A 24
page synopsis of findings for both Latin American and
Asian countries was produced. It was circulated among
interviewers, Ministry of Health staff in the participat-
ing countries and WHO focal points for verification and
complementation. Thereafter in June 2012 a three-day
international expert workshop was organised by WHO-
TDR involving all interviewers and two representatives
from Ministries of Health of each country. The 45 par-
ticipants were tasked to a) further validate the collected
information; b) interpret and regionalise country find-
ings and c) discuss recommendations. Expert consensus
was gained through mediation by the Chairpersons. The
following section provides the results of a synoptic ana-
lysis of the 10 study countries.
Results
Comparative results of the 10 study countries included
the description of the surveillance system (purpose,
stakeholders and operation –based on interviews and
document analysis), mechanisms of outbreak detection
(timeliness, validity, validation approaches, quality assur-
ance of data –based on interviews), country experiences
with the last outbreak (based on interviews, and docu-
ment analysis) and expert opinions about prospects and
limitations (based on interviews) [3]. The information
was summarised in the above mentioned data matrix and
further analysed during the expert meeting. The presenta-
tion of results in the text below follows a more functional
order. An overview of findings is presented in Table 1.
Organisation of dengue disease surveillance
Characteristics of the surveillance systems and reporting
All five Latin American and five Asian countries had na-
tional guidelines for disease surveillance, some with de-
tailed instructions, others in a very general form. All
countries had a public health surveillance system that in-
cluded a large number of infectious diseases, but somecountries had at national level a special dengue unit
(Brazil, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and
Vietnam). Dengue notification was mandatory in the
study countries- in Asian countries only hospitalised
cases or Dengue Haemorrhagic Fever cases- with the ex-
ception of the Maldives. Reporting by the private sector
was irregular or almost non-existent with the exception
of Brazil and parts of Vietnam. In all countries both
suspected and confirmed dengue cases were reported.
All Latin American countries and some Asian countries
(Vietnam, partly Malaysia and Indonesia) used the re-
vised WHO dengue case classification (dengue/severe
dengue [5]) for clinical case management (in Brazil with
modifications) and for reporting. However, the surveil-
lance system in Brazil and Mexico at the time of the
study used the dengue fever/dengue haemorrhagic fever/
dengue shock syndrome (DF/DHF/DSS) system which
was perceived by some respondents to be a problem.
The DF/DHF/DSS system was also used in parts of
Malaysia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.
Time-lag for reporting, data transmission and analysis
The time-lag for the reporting of suspected cases to the
central surveillance system was, according to the respon-
dents, only 1 to 3 days either from onset of symptoms or
discharge from hospital (according to reporting rules in
each country) with the exception of holiday periods or
major festivities when the information flow was interrupted
and outbreaks remained undetected (Colombia and Peru).
No sound analysis of the delay in reporting could be found
except for Brazil where more than 90% of cases were
reported within 10 days. The mode of data transmission
within the surveillance system was mainly electronic in
Brazil, Dominican Republic, most parts of Mexico and
Colombia, Malaysia (“e-dengue”), Maldives and parts of Sri
Lanka and Vietnam. Paper forms, usually transmitted by
fax or sometimes read out over the telephone, were used
in remote areas of the Dominican Republic, most parts of
Peru, Indonesia, Vietnam (partially electronic) and Sri
Lanka. In Latin America severe cases were reported daily
(in Brazil immediately) and suspected cases weekly. Also in
Malaysia and Vietnam daily reporting was the rule and in
other Asian countries weekly reporting. The analysis and
aggregation of data was mainly done at regional level (state,
department, region) and then sent to the national level. In
the Dominican Republic the analysis was mainly performed
at the national level. Peri-focal interventions (if any- see
below) were performed at local level using data from the
case reporting form. Geocoding of surveillance data was
not usually performed.
Laboratory confirmation
All Latin American countries attempted to carry out la-
boratory confirmation of all dengue suspected cases,
Table 1 Overview of findings on dengue disease surveillance, vector control, epidemic preparedness and
outbreak response
Organisation of disease surveillance
National guidelines,
obligatory notification
All study countries had guidelines for surveillance and obligatory notification of suspected and
confirmed cases of dengue (in Asia only the severe forms of the disease). No private
sector reporting except Brazil and parts of Vietnam
Laboratory confirmation All Latin American countries attempted 100% confirmation (IgM/IgG); in Asia < 10%
Data transmission Mainly electronic: Brazil, , Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Malaysia, Maldives, Sri Lanka (partly)
Mainly paper based, partly electronic: Peru, Indonesia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka
Data analysis At sub-national (state, department, province) and national level. Dominican Republic
mainly at national level.
Case classification Revised WHO classification [5] for clinical management throughout Latin America, Indonesia (partly),
Malaysia (partly), Vietnam the others used the dengue fever/dengue haemorrhagic fever/dengue
shock syndrome classification.
Active surveillance in sentinel sites All countries (Maldives only during outbreaks)
Use of alert signals Most countries collected information on different signals without using it for response (see below)
Routine evaluation of the
surveillance system
Weak in all countries except for Brazil, Colombia and Sri Lanka
Organisation of vector surveillance including community involvement
Larval surveys and outbreak alert Conducted in all countries (Maldives and Vietnam only in sentinel sites). Some indices used for
outbreak alert (Peru, Indonesia, Sri Lanka,)
Routine vector control Larviciding with temephos or Bti (all countries except Indonesia, Maldives, Vietnam)
Vector control issues Lack of resources, supervision and local involvement in decision making. Vector resistance.
Difficult interpretation of entomological indices.
Social mobilisation All countries use IEC materials, some use the COMBI method
Epidemic preparedness and outbreak response
Outbreak response plans All countries (except Maldives, Sri Lanka) with varying quality and details
Outbreak response committee Defined in all countries (except Maldives)
Outbreak definition Variable definition across countries and in some cases within countries. Some countries with no clear
distinction between outbreak and seasonal peak. Several countries use the 2SD of weekly cases
above the historical mean or the “moving average” (see text)
Delay of outbreak response Difficult to assess in most countries due to lack of outbreak definition and delayed reporting.
Time lag seems to be usually above 2 weeks but often much longer.
Alert signals and early response Signals used: entomological indices, increased virus positivity rate, change of serotype, increased case
numbers, increased number of fever cases, increased population movement. Information on several
signals is collected in some countries but not used for early response because of uncertainty about the
validity of the trigger (particularly entomological indices), budget limitations, staff shortage and
delay in analysis.
Successful response activities To a certain extent satisfactory vector control (all countries), improved clinical management,
improved coordination (intra-and inter-sectoral) and better information systems (selected countries)
Room for improvement Improved planning, training, involvement of local staff, enhanced community participation,
faster solution of budget constraints, and better cooperation among neighbouring municipalities.
Coping with dengue outbreaks in
hospitals (surge capacity)
Positive experiences: Epidemic response plans (in about half of study hospitals); establishing special
dengue treatment units; stock-out management (in a few hospitals). Issues were: getting additional beds
and staff, timely resource allocation, stock-out management (particularly intravenous fluids and
blood products) and clinical management by untrained staff.
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1 However, during outbreaks a small fraction of suspected
cases were tested: at least 10% in Brazil and 30% in Mexico.
In contrast, the laboratory confirmation of dengue in Asian
countries–generally using IgM/IgG ELISA- was done on a
small sample of patients (usually less than 10% of patients),
though laboratories used the same tests as Latin America.
The delay of serological confirmation was said to be usually3 days within large hospitals; in Sri Lanka virus isolation
took 2 weeks or longer.
Active (enhanced) surveillance
Active surveillance-particularly virus surveillance- in
sentinel sites (mainly hospitals) was practiced in all
countries, but in the Maldives only during outbreaks.
Viral surveillance including serotyping and genotyping
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Maldives and Dominican Republic where it was done in
neighbouring countries. DENV 1 to 4 was circulating in
all study countries except the Maldives where the situ-
ation is unknown. The main purpose of viral surveil-
lance was to detect the introduction or shift of sero/
genotypes for describing viral trends. However, this in-
formation was only used as an alert signal for a dengue
outbreak in Malaysia and sometimes in Vietnam and
Brazil, but no concrete response activities were linked to
it (see section on alert signals).Monitoring and evaluation of the surveillance system
The surveillance system itself had been evaluated systemat-
ically in some Latin American countries (Brazil and
Colombia, partially in the Dominican Republic) but sero-
surveys had not been used to establish sensitivity/specifi-
city of dengue reporting or to calculate a correction factor.
Within Asia, particularly Sri Lanka has an established
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanism for its sur-
veillance system; in the other countries M&E activities
were restricted to the occasional assessment of data quality
or to local projects (Malaysia, Maldives). Serological sur-
veys were in use in Malaysia and Vietnam for assessing
trends but not for estimating under or over-reporting of
dengue cases. Routine attempts to estimate the level of
over- and under-diagnosis of dengue were not in place in
most countries.
Staff training
Epidemiologists working on disease surveillance had had
some basic training (except for Peru and Mexico) but there
was generally no “on-the-job-training” in place. Only
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and occasionally Indonesia offered re-
fresher courses. High staff turn-over was a problem in
some places (particularly mentioned in Brazil, Colombia
and Maldives). The general view was that there was suffi-
cient expertise at national and regional level –with consid-
erable variation particularly within the large countries- but
not so at operational level.
Organisation of dengue vector surveillance
Vector surveillance by larval surveys was done routinely
in all countries by vector control staff (in Vietnam only
in “sentinel communes”, in Maldives only in some muni-
cipalities and in Brazil country-wide using a well-
established rapid system called LIRA). Pupal surveys for
determining productive container types for targeted in-
terventions [11] were occasionally carried out in some
countries; in others it was not clear how the identifica-
tion of productive containers was done. In all countries
the standard larval indices (HI, CI, BI) were used but
specific indicators were used for outbreak alert (BI in SriLanka, HI and BI in Vietnam and Indonesia, HI in Peru).
In some countries the vector control staff have the legal
power to enter premises (Dominican Republic, Colombia,
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia during outbreaks). Routine
vector control as a year-round practice was mainly done
with 1% temephos WG granulate (all countries except for
Indonesia, Maldives and Vietnam) and in some countries
with Bacillus thuringiensis, Bti (Brazil, Colombia, Maldives).
Biological control was implemented in some limited parts
of Vietnam (copepods) and larvivorous fish were used in
Sri Lanka. Source reduction was strong in big cities of
Indonesia (“3-M campaign”, clean, cover, remove water
containers). Issues of routine vector surveillance and con-
trol as identified by respondents were: a) Lack of resources
(Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka,
Vietnam); b) Lack of involvement of local level in decision
making (Dominican Republic, Peru, Vietnam); c) Limita-
tions in supervision and increasing vector resistance to
larvicides (Brazil); d) Difficulty in interpretation of entomo-
logical indices (Malaysia, Sri Lanka).Organisation of community participation
Social mobilisation programmes were present in all
countries and territories to varying degrees. Methods
such as COMBI (communication for behavioural impact,
mentioned in Dominican Republic, Malaysia, Maldives
and Indonesia) were popular. Information-education-
communication material (IEC) was also used with other
approaches: house visits, dissemination of flyers, didactic
materials in schools, banners and posters. The messages
were mainly delivered by health staff and/or volunteers
and religious leaders. The main barriers to a successful
programme were perceived to be budget limitations, lack
of a continuous and systematic approach with no impact
evaluation and often no empowerment of communities.Epidemic preparedness and outbreak response
Response plans
All countries (except Maldives; Sri Lanka plan not avail-
able at the time of the study) had an outbreak response
plan, some with detailed instructions, others in very gen-
eral terms (see analysis of contingency plans). In some
countries these plans had been made widely available; in
others they were mainly known and used at national level.
Some plans included instructions on training but this was
rarely implemented. Outbreak response committees were
defined in all countries (except Maldives); they comprised
major stakeholders from the public sector under the direc-
tion of the Ministry of Health (MoH); in a number of
countries these also comprised stakeholders from other
Ministries and Agencies (Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, Sri
Lanka, Vietnam).
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Definitions of a dengue outbreak showed marked differ-
ences and in a number of countries several, often incom-
patible definitions were in use. Only in 6 out of 10
countries was a fairly consistent definition applied:
a) Case numbers 2 Standard Deviations (SD) above the
mean of the preceding five years shown in endemic
channels (Colombia, Dominican Republic, Peru
(partially), Vietnam -national level). In Brazil and
Malaysia the “moving average” (mean or median) was
used, i.e. the “4-weekly average” above the mean of
“three 4-weekly averages” in the five preceding years.
b) >300 cases per 100,000 population at local level
(Brazil); > 10 cases per week in a local area (Sri
Lanka). Case number within a “commune” within 2
weeks: 2–20 cases = mild outbreak; 20–100
cases=moderate outbreak; >100 cases = severe
outbreak (Vietnam).
c) Two or more connected dengue cases at local level
(Mexico, Malaysia, Sri Lanka partially).
d) Continuous increase of dengue cases for 2 periods
(hours, days, weeks) or double the number of cases
within a month compared to the previous year, or
50% increase in case fatality rate, (Indonesia).
e) No outbreak definition (Maldives); no clear outbreak
definition but larval indices as trigger for response:
BI <6= routine response; BI= 5-20= house-to-house
checks; BI> 20 = fogging (Sri Lanka).Characteristics of dengue outbreaks
Due to country variation in outbreak definitions it was
impossible to compare a number of variables, including
the duration of a dengue outbreak, total number of
cases, cases during the worst week, and geographical
distribution. This applies particularly to those countries
that did not distinguish between seasonal increase of
cases and outbreak; only the number of cases at the end
of the wet season (“dengue season”) could be estimated.
In countries with an outbreak definition the average dur-
ation of a dengue outbreak at provincial, regional and
state level was recorded as 10.2 months (range 5 to 13
months) and the average number of cases was 26 732
(range 12 171 to 69680 cases). In Brazil the average inci-
dence rate of dengue cases during outbreaks was 538
per 100 000 population, clearly in excess of the 300-
threshold (detailed analysis of a set of dengue outbreaks
to be published by the Brazilian partner).Time-lag between outbreak detection and response
Again, due to the lack of a standardised outbreak defin-
ition it was difficult to establish the time-lag betweenstart of the outbreak and response, but in some coun-
tries the following information was collected:
a) Two to four week gap from the start of a sudden
increase in cases to the interpretation of information
for decision making (Brazil; to be confirmed by an
on-going analysis of Brazilian dengue outbreaks).
b) Fast recognition of the start of an outbreak (2 to 5
days) but delay for several weeks to get the response
in place (Dominican Republic). Similar situation in
Mexico where the delayed allocation of extra budget
was an issue.
c) Slow interpretation of case increase (1 month) and 2
additional weeks for start of the response (Peru,
Maldives).
d) Confusion about the start of the outbreak but then a
relatively fast response (1 week) in Mexico.
Alert signals (risk indicators) for outbreaks
Alert signals for a dengue outbreak were used differently
and often un-systematically. These include:
a) Increase in cases > 2SD above the mean of previous
years (Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru
with different thresholds defined by individual
states) or above the “moving average”(Brazil,
Malaysia–see outbreak definition).
b) Elevated entomological indices: Breteau Index (BI)
and/or House Index (HI) (Peru and Vietnam), BI
(Sri Lanka), BI/HI/Container Index determined by
rapid routine survey LIRA (Brazil).
c) Increased virus positivity rate in blood samples
(Dominican Republic).
d) 25% more cases per week compared to previous year
(Dominican Republic) or 50% increase (Indonesia,
Bantul and Yogyakarta).
e) Change of serotype (Peru) or increase in dengue
incidence during dry season (Peru).
f ) Various other signals were monitored by surveillance
systems but they were not linked to early responses:
increased rain fall and temperature (in all study
countries), recent displacement of dengue patients
into non-endemic areas (Colombia) and population
movements (Sri Lanka).
Thus in some countries the “alert signals for an out-
break” are the same as the “outbreak definition” leading
to late alert and delayed response. The following issues
mentioned by the respondents hampered the prediction/
early detection of a dengue outbreak:
a) Low capacity of clinical and entomological alert
signals to predict an outbreak (Brazil). Restricted
number of variables included in the list of alert
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only on a monthly basis (Indonesia).
b) Inadequate preparation of municipalities and states
in the use of alert signals (Brazil). Shortage of staff
and training opportunities (Sri Lanka). No strict
application of alert signals at sub-national level
(Dominican Republic, Mexico).
c) Budget limitations during inter-epidemic periods
(Colombia, Mexico) and during response activities
(Vietnam, Indonesia).
d) No outbreak declarations issued (Vietnam) or issued
very late (Maldives).
Outbreak response
In all study countries the response to a dengue outbreak
was carried out first by the vector control services and in-
cluded outdoor space spraying, and in some countries in-
door fogging in critical areas. In all countries, additional
clean up campaigns, larviciding with 1% temephos WG
and exceptionally with Bti was used. These activities were
often complemented by larval surveillance. Community in-
volvement was reported to be strong in Indonesia and
parts of Maldives.
Country respondents mentioned a number of successful
activities in dengue outbreak response. These included suc-
cessful vector control interventions (all countries), im-
proved clinical management (due to better clinical training
and obligatory analysis of dengue deaths); leadership and
better inter-sectoral cooperation in outbreak response
(Brazil, Peru, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Indonesia),
improved information system (Brazil, Sri Lanka).
Room for improvement of outbreak response, add-
itionally to the request for a standardised outbreak def-
inition, was mentioned including:
a) Earlier outbreak detection, planning, administrative
procedures (Dominican Republic, Peru, Sri Lanka) as
well as improved budget and/or budget planning
(Colombia, Peru, Maldives, Sri Lanka) and cooperation
among municipalities (Brazil, Dominican Republic)
with locally developed plans (Mexico).
b) Better training (Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Indonesia,
Sri Lanka) particularly of local health staff and civil
servants (Brazil, Dominican Republic, Maldives).
c) Better community involvement and promotional
activities (Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Sri Lanka,) including improved routine vector
control (Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Maldives, Sri Lanka).
Surge capacity (coping capacity) of hospitals with dengue
outbreaks
In the five Latin American countries 21 hospitals were
analysed. Six hospitals were small (20–30 beds, DominicanRepublic only), 13 hospitals were middle sized (90 to 400
beds) and 2 were large (above 400 beds, Colombia and Do-
minican Republic). The annual bed occupancy rate was
70% to (exceptionally) 100%.
In the five Asian countries 20 hospitals were analysed.
Two were small hospitals (50 to 100 beds), 6 were middle
sized (100 to 400 beds) and 12 were large (more than 400
beds). The annual bed occupancy rate was 80% to 120%.
The last dengue outbreak in the study countries had
occurred 18 months to 4 months preceding the inter-
views. Epidemic response plans existed in 9 out of 21
Latin American hospitals; most of these plans included
recommendations for dealing with stock-outs. In Asia 12
of the 20 hospitals had epidemic response plans and par-
ticularly Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam had special den-
gue units for enhanced dengue clinical management.
During the dengue outbreak operational problems oc-
curred in most hospitals and different coping strategies
were applied. Special dengue units were perceived to be
very helpful for clinical management (particularly in
Peru, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Vietnam).
Additional beds were made available in 13 of the 21
Latin American Hospitals, using mainly stretchers,
discarded beds or beds from other wards. Asian hospitals
used trolleys and foldable beds (Malaysia), mattresses on
the floor (Sri Lanka) or two patients in one bed (Vietnam).
Sometimes dengue patients had to be discharged earlier,
elective surgeries had to be cancelled or in exceptional
cases non-dengue patients had to be referred to
neighbouring hospitals. A strategy adopted by Brazil to
reinforce the hospital capacity was to establish tents with
beds for intravenous fluid and observation.
Additional staff could be hired in 7 Latin American hos-
pitals but extended shifts and transfer of staff from non-
dengue wards was the usual strategy. Dengue patients were
discharged early or referred to another hospital in just 2
hospitals. However, no negative implications for non-
dengue patients were reported. In Asia, there was transfer
of staff from non-dengue wards when necessary (Malaysia)
or staff had additional or prolonged shifts (all other coun-
tries). In some instances relatives helped with monitoring
fluid balance. Stock outs, mainly intravenous fluids-
occurred in at least 5 of the 21 Latin American hospitals
and shortage of reagents was reported in 4 hospitals. Brazil
had a positive experience with a recently established
laboratory network which was able to handle the surge in
specimens. In 3 Asian hospitals stock-outs of colloid solu-
tions and blood products were reported; in one hospital
laboratory tests had to be outsourced to private clinics.
Discussion
Prospects and limitations of the study
This study details a novel attempt to use a standard
methodology across 10 Latin American and Asian
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veillance, outbreak detection and response. As with all
qualitative data, subjective bias may have been introduced
through the opinions and perceptions of individual respon-
dents; variability in responses was noted between country
interviewees in the following areas: reporting delays, timeli-
ness of outbreak detection and response and assessment of
effectiveness of interventions. However, the use of comple-
mentary data collection methodologies, combined with
several rounds of verification with country representatives
at the WHO-TDR expert meeting ensured the triangula-
tion of information collected from various sources and fa-
cilitated a high level of internal validity. Whilst any attempt
to fully characterise the global situation of dengue surveil-
lance and outbreak detection/response would require a
stratified random sampling of countries, the detailed data
gathered and presented here from a diversity of countries
in both Latin America and Asia provides useful informa-
tion towards the development of an evidence-based model
contingency plan for dengue outbreaks.
Based on the data presented in the previous section,
the WHO-TDR expert meeting with country representa-
tives identified best practices, reasons for failures and re-
search needs. The discussion below focuses on key areas
identified for improvement.
Need for distinguishing between “expected increase in
cases” (i.e. seasonal peak) and “unexpected increase in
cases” (i.e. an outbreak).
Our findings show that most countries did not distin-
guish between a seasonal rise in dengue cases, usually dur-
ing the rainy season (see Figure 1), and the unexpected
increase in cases above a defined threshold, usually called
an outbreak [2,12]; the number of reported cases exceeding
expected levels is referred to as “aberrations” [13]. The
need for dengue control and clinical care systems to re-
spond differently to each of these scenarios was identified.
The expected increase of dengue vectors and subsequently
of cases during the “dengue season” requires routine mea-
sures be stepped up at a relatively predicable point each
year. The annual need for increased vector control staff
should correspond to the weeks when the vector density
increases and preparations should be made for adequate
staffing levels, equipment and supply (including chemicals
and/or biological agents, IEC materials and other elements
of social mobilisation). Likewise, clinical services should
define in their annual plans the additional staff, equipment,
reagents and treatment units needed and whether clinical
refresher courses are required. The dengue outbreak as an
“unexpected increase of cases” requires additional efforts
that are described below.
Need for an agreed outbreak definition
The data on country experiences shows a wide range of
definitions used for defining dengue outbreaks, sometimesleading to confusion for stakeholders and delayed emer-
gency outbreak responses. Discussions at the expert meet-
ing identified the importance of a generally agreed
outbreak definition. Many countries use a version of the
“endemic channel” for visualising the expected case levels,
based on the weekly (or monthly) average number of cases
over the preceding 5 years. Above this is a line that repre-
sents +2SD; others use the median and the 3rd quartile
(Figure 1).
The area between the lines of the mean and +2SD is
called “alert zone” or “alarm zone” and the area above
the +2SD line or Q3 line is called the “epidemic zone”
showing the aberrations (Figure 2). If the weekly number
of dengue cases crosses the “historical” 2SD line, then it
is called an “outbreak”. Figure 3 shows a dengue out-
break with the blue line of “weekly number of cases”
crossing the +2SD line several times between week one
and 17 until the case numbers shoot up in week 18, a
typical pattern observed in dengue outbreaks (Siqueira,
unpublished data).
According to the WHO-TDR expert meeting the follow-
ing advantages of the “+ 2SD” outbreak definition were
identified: a) The “endemic channel” is a simple instrument
and the crossing of the 2SD line is easy to assess; b) a
standard definition of a dengue outbreak can be used to in-
form the mass media and the public about the actual situ-
ation; c) it is possible to determine the size of an outbreak
in terms of duration, total number of dengue cases, case fa-
tality rate and thereby facilitate in-country and cross-
country comparisons; d) it helps to assess the effect of
response mechanisms and to define “stopping rules” (when
the intensified response can be terminated).
Possible disadvantages of such a definition were also
identified: a) Programme managers may be tempted to
use the crossing of the +2SD line as a “warning sign” for
an outbreak (rather than as an indicator that an out-
break is effectively already underway) and initiate a de-
layed emergency response; b) the definition has limited
sensitivity (only 40% of such events when case numbers
crossed the +2SD threshold were followed by a
“massive” increase of cases in Puerto Rico [13]; using a
similar predictor with a 1 SD threshold, Barbazan et al.
[14] found a sensitivity of 66%) c) outbreaks in previous
years can result in thresholds that are too high; no satis-
factory algorithm for recognising past aberrations has
been devised [12]; d) the seasonal increase in cases may
come earlier than in the 5 preceding years providing the
impression of an outbreak. This phenomenon has been
handled by using the “deviation bar chart” [13] or the
“moving average” applied in Brazil and Malaysia (“mov-
ing median”). In this case, the average of dengue cases
during 4 weeks is compared with the average of cases
during a period of 12 weeks in the preceding 5 years (i.e.
the same 4 weeks as the actual observation period plus 4
Figure 1 Illustration of the seasonal variation of a vector borne disease like dengue. An example of an ‘endemic channel’ is shown here.
The ’expected increase in cases’ usually coincides with, or follows, the rainy season. The shaded area corresponds to an ‘alarm zone’ where case
numbers reach levels above the mean (or median) of a preceding time period (for example 5 years). The ‘epidemic zone’ is entered when case
numbers reach levels above 2 standard deviations (or the third quartile).
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[15]). In Puerto Rico the sensitivity of such a “deviation
bar chart” for indicating a dengue outbreak was 40% and
the specificity was 90% [13] e) when the geographical
units are too small, the variation of cases increases and
may show wide oscillations.
Other outbreak definitions, for instance the” incidence
threshold” (i.e. when the number of cases during a week
passes a pre-defined threshold level, such as 300 per
100,000 population as used in Brazil) need moreFigure 2 An example of an outbreak curve of case numbers from the
crosses the “historical” +2SD line from week 1 to 17 several times before, inresearch regarding sensitivity and specificity. The defin-
ition of “two interconnected dengue cases” should be
limited to an outbreak definition in non-endemic areas;
however, it may be used to trigger routine operations
(peri-focal interventions) in local areas.
It was felt by the expert meeting that a clear and uni-
versally accepted definition of an outbreak is important
and that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. A
standardised outbreak definition can help to send uni-
form messages to inform the general public and makeDominican Republic is shown here. The number of new cases
week 18, the case numbers definitively rise.
Figure 3 Illustration of the different phases of a dengue outbreak and different levels of response. An example of an outbreak curve
from Colombia in 2009 is shown here. An ‘outbreak alert’ is identified early through a combination of ‘alert signals’, and triggers an ‘initial
response’. The evolution into ‘early’ and ‘full outbreaks’ are detected early using standard definitions and trigger appropriately staged ‘early’ and
‘emergency responses’.
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countries. However, it has to be emphasised that the re-
sponse to an outbreak should start much earlier and not
as an “emergency response” (see below).
Need for identifying alert signals (warning signs, risk
factors, response triggers)
Control measures come probably too late when they are
implemented at the start of an outbreak (“late or emer-
gency response” [16]). It is therefore recommended to
react in a timely and structured way to an algorithm of
alert signals for a dengue outbreak. The combination of
these signals may vary between countries and also de-
pend on the availability of resources. For example, some
countries routinely perform virological testing on
suspected dengue blood samples and use an increase as
a warning sign (as in the Dominican Republic); however
no standardised response to the increase of viral positiv-
ity is defined. As Farrington and Andrews [12] stated:
“The real difficulty lies in…setting up appropriate proto-
cols for deciding which signals to investigate and which
to ignore and for communicating effectively the role and
limitations of automated systems”. Some countries such
as Brazil are testing a number of signals for use as out-
break predictors. Others collect information on climatic,
viral and other variables but do not use them for out-
break alert. The use of BI or other larval indices with de-
fined thresholds for different levels of response (see Sri
Lanka), was controversially discussed as there is noevidence that larval indices reflect adult vector densities
and the thresholds were felt to be arbitrary. Pupal indi-
ces seem to be more promising but need to be evaluated
further [17]. It was emphasised that research on ento-
mological alert signals, including the time lapse between
increase of entomological signals and increase of case
numbers, is urgently needed.
The expert meeting proposed a set of indicators (that
will need to be tested and validated) as part of a scoring
system that allows the definition of thresholds for epi-
demic responses (Table 2). Additionally an algorithm
was proposed for further testing:
Early response will be triggered when any two of the
following conditions are met at the local level in any
given week:
1. Increase in dengue sero-positivity (level of increase
to be defined).
2. Dengue outbreak in a neighbouring geographical
area (district/province/region/country).
3. Increase of febrile cases /probable dengue cases in
sentinel sites (level of increase to be defined).
In addition, the early response should be informed by
entomological surveillance, geographical location of
cases and shifts in the age distribution of dengue cases.
The alert signals as triggers for response are presented
in Table 2. They may vary from country to country as
the surveillance systems collect different kinds of data.
Table 2 Proposed alert signals (triggers for early response) as suggested by the WHO-TDR expert meeting (June 2012)
Trigger Evidence or
expert opinion**
Feasibility Further
research needed***
New predominant serotype introduced +++ Most countries +++
Changes in age group distribution ++ Most countries +++
Increased number of hospitalised/outpatient fever cases/probable dengue* +++ Most countries +++
Increase in vector presence ++ Most countries +++
Increase in news reporting dengue outbreaks, social network comments + Few countries ++++
Climate changes: increase in rainfall/temperature/humidity ++ Most countries +++
Increase in % positive serology* ++++ Most countries +
Increase internal displacement/population mobility + Context dependent ++++
Cluster identified through GIS mapping ++ Few countries ++
Identification of outbreak in a neighboring geographical unit
(state, district, province, country)*
++++ Most countries ++
*Particularly useful indicators/ triggers.
** ++++ very strong; +++ strong; ++fairly strong; + weak.
*** ++++highest priority; +++ high priority; ++ necessary.
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alert signals
The research needs presented in Table 2 were
complemented by the following more detailed
recommendations:
a) Retrospective and prospective analysis of different
thresholds for outbreak detection (eg. 2 SD above
mean; 1 SD; 50% above mean) and calculation of theFigure 4 Essential elements of a surveillance and preparedness systemsensitivity and specificity of these thresholds for
subsequent outbreaks.
b) Long term representative sentinel based vector
surveillance to assess the association of vector
indices with clinical cases and the usefulness of alert
signals based on virus surveillance, vector
surveillance, climate data and others.
c) Prospective comparison of monthly incidence by
province with virus surveillance data to see whetherto ensure an early, staged outbreak response.
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(determine positive predictive value of such events)
and with what approximate time lag.
Need for different levels of outbreak response: initial
response, early response, emergency response
Whilst our data showed that countries used varied and
multi-faceted outbreak response mechanisms, the timing
and intensity of these were often poorly informed and
sometimes fragmented. In order to help initiate and dir-
ect staged response activities, the expert meeting identi-
fied the following stages of an outbreak (Figure 3):
1. Outbreak alert: when several alert signals point to a
possible imminent dengue outbreak.
2. Early outbreak: when the weekly number of cases
crosses the 2SD line in the endemic channel.
3. Full outbreak: when the case numbers increase
rapidly.
After revising the country experiences, it was
recognised at the expert meeting that each phase re-
quires a tailored response:
Initial response during the alert phase includes: con-
vening local dengue committees; activation of syndromic
surveillance if not done on a routine basis; enhancement
of routine activities (such as vector control and alerts for
hospitals).
Early response during the early outbreak phase in-
cludes: convening local dengue or emergency operations
committees; implementation of existing vector control
guidelines; proper planning for contingency (human, finan-
cial and logistic resources) and intensification of focal
intervention (vector reservoir control with community par-
ticipation); social mobilisation (ICE, community participa-
tion, mass media partnerships); gathering of background
information (cartography, demographics, inventory of facil-
ities etc.); alerting hospitals and health centres (distribute
guidelines for case detection and treatment; create or alert
an outbreak management team); enhancement of surveil-
lance and activation of syndromic surveillance and sentinel
sites; enhancement of established communication channels
(public health, clinical care, education system, media, the
public, national and international authorities).
Early response in clinical settings includes: circula-
tion of national guidelines on clinical management of
dengue; staff training including officers in public and
private hospitals; engagement of the private sector; es-
tablishment of dengue treatment areas in major hospitals
and in high risk districts. Health services management
should include: a) National/Provincial/District Steering
Committees; b) the circulation of Hospital Dengue Pre-
paredness and Contingency plans (which should include
plans for mobilisation of doctors/nurses within the regionand from other specialties, and plans for surge in bed re-
quirement); c) health education messages for the
community.
Emergency response (or late response) during the
fully developed outbreak includes the full application of
the contingency plans. The duration of the response
measures needs to be defined. If these are terminated
too early, the outbreak may simply be shifted to a later
date but if the measures are stopped too late, resources
may be wasted.
Research recommendation for a staged outbreak
response
The staged outbreak response suggested here will need
to be tested prospectively for its feasibility, effectiveness
in mitigating dengue outbreaks, cost-effectiveness (i.e.
cost in relation to number of expected dengue cases
avoided) and acceptance by all relevant stakeholders.
Conclusions
The work presented here on lessons learned from country
experiences in dengue surveillance, outbreak prediction, de-
tection and response has demonstrated variation in practice
and areas for improvement. Best practices were identified.
They include improved surveillance (through electronic
reporting, laboratory networks for mutual support and in-
formation exchange, standardised data collection, process-
ing and feedback, strengthened monitoring and evaluation
activities, enhanced capacity building) and improved early
outbreak detection (through the use of pre-tested alarm sig-
nals and a standardised outbreak definition) in order to ini-
tiate a staged outbreak response (initial, early and late
responses) applying predefined procedures. Further details
are captured in Figure 4. There is increasing consensus that
a certain level of standardisation, summarised in a model
contingency plan, would help countries improve their pre-
paredness for dengue outbreaks. This would also allow for
greater cross-country sharing of experiences and ideas.
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